Abstract. A central goal in governing the interface of the economies of the United States and European Community (EC) is to reconcile the objectives of protective social regulation
I. Introduction
By the late 1990s, the value of trade between the United States and European Community (EC) 2 combined with sales of U.S. and EC affiliates in each other's markets had expanded to exceed $1.7 trillion. 3 With this rise in transatlantic trade and investment, developments on one side of the Atlantic increasingly affect citizens, business enterprises and interest groups on the other, and, in turn, these groups' demands on their respective government representatives. With tariff rates at historic lows for most categories of goods, transatlantic trade issues increasingly have become regulatory ones-that is, divergent regulatory laws and procedures in themselves not only restrain trade, and thus transatlantic competition, but they can do so in an asymmetrical discriminatory manner. A central question facing national legislators, executives and administrative officials is how to govern transatlantic economic interdependence while maintaining social standards responsive to their respective constituencies' demands.
The United States and EC thus increasingly face the difficult task of reconciling the objectives of protective social regulation, on the one hand, and free competition facilitated through open trade policies, on the other, in a complex, rapidly changing environment. Depending on the context, these objectives can be complementary or in conflict. For example, the goals of domestic regulatory and free trade policies are both to protect and benefit citizenconsumers, in which sense they are complementary. Social regulatory policies, at least in their ideal form, are to protect consumers from the risk of market failures through state regulatory intervention. Open trade policies, at least in their ideal form, intend to offer consumers a wider selection of goods at lower prices, thereby expanding their consumption possibilities and increasing their standard of living. 4 Regulatory and trade policies, however, may conflict for two primary reasons. First, domestic lawmakers and regulators typically do not take account of the impact of domestic regulations on foreigners, primarily because foreigners do not have a voice in domestic political and regulatory processes. 5 Even absent a discriminatory intent, regulatory requirements can be duplicative, redundant or otherwise disproportionately affect traded products, in part because 2 The term EC is used in this Article instead of EU (or European Union) because it is EC institutions that enter into bilateral agreements with the United States under the "first pillar" of the Treaty of European Union (TEU) of 1992. The TEU changed the name of the European Economic Community to the European Community to denote that the European Community had integrated beyond purely economic matters. The TEU also created three separate pillars of activities for the regional block. The first pillar concerned all traditional EC matters, as expanded by the TEU to cover, in particular, European economic and monetary union. The 1997 U.S.-EC Mutual Recognition Agreement thus refers to the EC as a party, and not to the EU. Commentators, however, often use the term EU because it is broader in scope, covering all three pillars of activities. 3 Mark Pollack and Gregory Shaffer, Transatlantic Governance in Historical and Theoretical Perspective, in options can be complementary, sometimes working in tandem.
A. Overview of the EC's Coordination of National Regulatory Systems. Since 1985, the EC has adopted what it terms "new" and "global" approaches to European regulation, under which EC institutions only legislate "essential requirements," delegate the determination of more-detailed standards to quasi-public European standards organizations (the "new approach"), and then coordinate quasi-public national certification bodies to certify products produced in any one member state for sale throughout the EC market (the "global approach"). 14 In 1985, the European Commission issued a bulletin that set forth its "new approach" to harmonization in response to the market-distorting and market-segregating impact of multiple national standards and the difficulty of appropriately overcoming them at the EC level, especially in light of rapidly changing technologies. 15 Under this "new approach," the Council of Ministers (the Council) enacts framework directives for technical standards covering "essential requirements." 16 The 1987 Single European Act modified voting rules for the enactment of EC internal market legislation to a "qualified majority" vote (as opposed to unanimity), thereby eliminating member state veto rights in the Council. This combination of qualified majority voting and the reduction of EC-prescribed standards to "essential requirements," together with the EC's highly-publicized push to "complete" an EC internal market by 1992, led to the adoption of a series of EC harmonization directives. 17 Under this "new approach" to regulation, the Council delegates the task of drawing up more-detailed standards to industrial standardization bodies operating under the umbrella of three European standards organizations: CEN, CENELEC and ETSI. 18 These European standards organizations are comprised of national standards bodies that, in turn, include representatives from government, industry and other social groups. The European standards bodies vote on a simple majority basis (following a first round of voting), 19 facilitating the adoption of "nonessential" technical standards. These standards are not internally binding on the member states, so that member states retain some de jure autonomy. However, these standards have become de facto harmonized requirements for selling products within the EC because of their importance in conducting a sufficient risk assessment). Just as mutual recognition policies, such judicial challenges facilitate regulatory competition through which consumers implicitly choose among production processes when they purchase products on the market. 14 Guide to the Implementation of Directives Based on the New Approach and the Global Approach. (visited Feb. 25, 2002) <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/newapproach/legislation/guide/document/1999_1282_en.pdf >. 15 Technical Harmonization and Standards: A New Approach: Bull. EC 1-1985. 16 Id. 17 Egan notes the adoption of 21 "new approach" harmonization directives between 1985-2000 covering a wide range of industries and giving rise to 2,905 standardization acts ratified or in the process of preparation or approval by standards organizations as of June 1997. See 20 Under what is termed the EC's "global approach" to regulation, products may be tested and certified within any member state in order to receive a "CE" marking (which indicates that they comply with "Communauté Européen" norms. All member states must recognize these certifications (i.e. mandatory mutual recognition), such that certified products may circulate freely throughout the EC market. In 1990, the member states formed the European Organization for Testing and Certification (EOTC) to coordinate national bodies engaged in the certification process and thereby help assure national authorities of the reliability of tests conducted in other member states. 21 Each member state must approve and is responsible for overseeing the certification bodies within its jurisdiction and must notify the Commission's Enterprise Directorate-General (DG) of its approvals. These testing and certification laboratories consequently are referred to as "notified bodies." 22 Member state authorities periodically meet and exchange information about the process' operation through working groups and committees created pursuant to the respective directives. They thereby attempt to build and retain confidence in the system. 23 This EC system can be characterized as governance by coordinated cross-border public-private networks. 24 Even though the CE marking alone is required for customs purposes, the trade names and trademarks of national notified bodies can remain advantageous for marketing purposes within member states. National distributors and suppliers sometimes prefer certification by national bodies within their own jurisdiction in order to reduce the risk of marketing products certified by a foreign body. Market barriers thus arise not only from government intervention and regulatory distrust, but also from the perceptions of private actors in the market. In short, the EC's endeavors, while generally successful, have encountered setbacks, stalemates and ongoing challenges, despite the EC's deployment of considerable institutional resources. Bulletin, "the authorities in the Member States will be obliged to recognize that products manufactured in accordance with harmonized standards [set by private bodies]... are presumed to conform to the 'essential requirements' laid down in the Directive; this means that any manufacturer will be free to produce goods which do not meet the standards, but the burden of proof that his products meet the essential requirements of the Directive will then fall upon him." See Technical Harmonization and Standards: A New Approach, (art. 1.3.3(iv)), supra note.... 21 190 . 22 The overall process is called the "global approach" because once a notified body certifies that a product meets EC standards, the product may be marketed in all fifteen member states. 23 Firms and laboratories also remain subject to post-marketing member state regulatory controls, as well as marketreputational constraints. 24 See Renaud Dehousse, Regulation by networks in the European Community: the role of European agencies, 4 J. OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 246 (1997); Egan, Constructing a European Market, supra note..., at 12. See also R.A.W. Rhodes, The New Governance: Governing without Government, 44 POLITICAL STUDIES 652 (1996) (theoretical background on governance through networks). 25 See EGAN, CONSTRUCTING A EUROPEAN MARKET, supra note..., at 229 ("Firms continue to experience difficulties in persuading other economic operators or suppliers to accept the results of conformity assessment from bodies they do not know, or to accept national standards and marking arrangements that they are not familiar with."); and DAVID VOGEL, BARRIERS OR BENEFITS: REGULATION IN (2000) (noting that "no member state was able to meet the deadline" for implementing the 1993 Active B. Harmonization and Mutual Recognition in the Transatlantic Context: Can the EC System Be Exported? While there has been little effort to harmonize standards on a purely transatlantic basis, the United States and European member states have negotiated through international fora. In turn, such international standards can facilitate the negotiation of bilateral mutual recognition agreements because, where parties operate under common standards and procedures, they more easily understand and develop trust in each other's regulatory practices. For example, the1997 U.S.-EC Mutual Recognition Agreement is based largely on the mutual recognition of test results by "Conformity Assessment Bodies,"
26 which, in turn, are evaluated pursuant to international standards set forth in ISO/IEC Guides.
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The EC has tended to look more favorably toward international harmonization efforts than the United States for two primary reasons. First, EC member states and European standards organizations have more experience in negotiating and implementing agreements with third parties in light of the EC's own internal market process. 28 Second, in international organizations where each country has one vote, the EC's fifteen member states can work collectively so that, overall, they are more likely to promote EC-based standards in multilateral fora. For example, two of the most widely known ISO standards, ISO 9000 and ISO 14000 were developed initially within Europe.
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Mutual recognition agreements, in contrast, have been negotiated not internationally, but bilaterally or through regional fora. For example, the United States and EC have or are in the process of negotiating mutual recognition agreements under the auspices of APEC and CITEL, as well as with individual countries, such as Canada, Australia, Japan, New Zealand and Israel. 30 Implantable Medical Devices Directive and "most member states were not able to designate their [notified bodies] in time"). 26 "Conformity Assessment Bodies" are the transatlantic analogue of "notified bodies" operating within the EC market in the context of the EC's "global approach." 27 The international standard-setting bodies relevant to the sectors covered by transatlantic mutual recognition agreements include: the International Standards Organization (ISO) (for a broad range of standards); the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) (for testing and certification standards); Codex Alimentarius (for food-related standards); the International Conference on Harmonization (for pharmaceutical standards); the Global Harmonization Task Force (for medical device standards); and the International Maritime Organization (for marine safety standards).
Codex Alimentarius, a joint undertaking of the World Health Organization and the Food and Agricultural Organization, is relevant to the U.S.-EC Veterinary Equivalence Agreement. This latter agreement is not yet operational and is not covered in this Article. The International Conference on Harmonization is a program that "harmonizes requirements and guidelines for testing drugs and biologies." Its members are the Commission, the European Medicines Evaluation Agency, EC member state regulators, Japan's health ministry and U.S. European and Japanese pharmaceutical trade industry associations. See Linda Horton, Mutual Recognition Agreements and Harmonization, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 692, 717-718 (1998). The Global Harmonization Task Force consists of regulators from the US, EC, Canada, Japan and Australia, although the Task Force now admits observers from many other countries. 28 As Vogel writes in respect of harmonization of pharmaceutical guidelines and standards, "the experience the Europeans gained in harmonizing regulations among the EU's member states has both enabled and encouraged it to play a leadership role in promoting international regulatory cooperation." See David Vogel, The Globalization of Pharmaceutical Regulation, 11 GOVERNANCE 1, 14 (Jan. 1998). 29 The EC's experience in harmonizing and coordinating fifteen national regulatory systems offers a model to be considered, and possibly exported, to these other contexts, including the transatlantic one. Yet, the EC's own experience also highlights the challenges that the United States and EC face in governing the interface of their economies. As this Article will demonstrate, there is even more distrust between regulators on either side of the Atlantic, there are greater challenges of political legitimacy, and the marketplace imposes even more severe constraints on the effective implementation of mutual recognition agreements in the transatlantic context.
III. The 1997 U.S.-EC Mutual Recognition Agreement
A. What Gave Rise to the 1997 Mutual Recognition Agreement? The issue of transatlantic standards became more important to firms engaged in transatlantic trade for two primary reasons. First, as transatlantic tariff barriers decreased, firms became more concerned with, what they termed, duplicative regulatory compliance costs. 31 They pressed for their removal. This pressure increased with rising transatlantic investment, since divergent U.S. and EC standards and certification requirements most directly affect transatlantic corporate groups, and these groups more easily coordinate lobbying on both sides of the Atlantic. Subsidiaries of U.S. firms in the EC account for about one-third of EC imports from the United States, while subsidiaries of EC firms in the United States account for about 38% of U.S. imports from the EC.
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Second, when the EC moved toward a single market, U.S. firms challenged that the EC was erecting a "fortress Europe" in which member states would use common "single market" standards and certification procedures to prejudice U.S. competition. 33 U.S. firms feared that they would be disadvantaged because, under the EC's "global approach," only notified bodies located within the EC could test and certify products for marketing in the EC. 34 Prior to the "global approach," U.S.-based laboratories acted as subcontractors for the testing of products under member state standards, and firms feared that this option might be foreclosed.
35
In response to these developments, U.S. and EC authorities began to seriously address issues of regulatory coordination at the beginning of the 1990s. Commerce Robert Mosbacher and Commission Vice-President Martin Bangemann agreed to explore the possibility of transatlantic mutual recognition agreements, as well as mechanisms to grant U.S. firms greater access to EC standard-setting procedures. 36 In 1995, the United States and EC signed the New Transatlantic Agenda and its attached "Joint Action Plan" which contained a detailed list of items to address. However, at the NTA's annual summits, transatlantic diplomats found it difficult to operationalize the action plan in concrete ways that benefited their constituents. Negotiators were soon in search of "deliverables" in order to show that the NTA was more than an empty symbol.
Large businesses on each side of the Atlantic, working under the auspices of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), promoted the concept of mutual recognition agreements as a concrete policy initiative that would meet business needs.
37 TABD rapidly became a significant independent voice, identifying areas of concern and coordinating pressure on officials to set time tables for the signature and implementation of mutual recognition agreements. 38 43 Yet, as will be seen, both transatlantic businesses and government officials have become less enamored with mutual recognition agreements in light of their experience with the 1997 agreement.
B. Transatlantic Business Practice before the 1997 MRA. In order to understand the limited scope of the 1997 MRA, it is helpful to briefly review how businesses often had their products certified before its negotiation, and how many continue to operate. Firms and laboratories have adapted over time to differing U.S. and EC regulatory requirements through entering into sub-contracting arrangements. Still today, private testing bodies often test products in the manufacturer's place of production on one side of the Atlantic in accordance with standards set on the other, and then have these test results certified by an accredited body in the importing jurisdiction. The domestic testing body operates under a sub-contracting arrangement with the responsible certification body in the importing jurisdiction. 44 For example, for the European market, laboratories in the United States can test U.S. products under EC standards and provide the paperwork to a "notified body" in Europe that certifies them. In addition, large European notified bodies, themselves, have invested in the United States to provide these testing services in an integrated manner. Now that U.S. regulatory agencies increasingly recognize testing by private laboratories, U.S. laboratories too have entered into sub-contracting arrangements with European counterparts for product certification under U.S. standards. Large U.S. laboratories similarly have invested in Europe, and in some cases, themselves become EC notified bodies. 45 In consequence, the sectoral annexes to the 1997 MRA, assessed below, do not represent a significant change for many businesses, but rather a slight extension of subcontracting practices that have already adapted to regulatory and commercial developments. In fact, sub-contracting is specifically contemplated in some of the MRA's sectoral annexes, such as for telecommunications equipment, which provide that Conformity Assessment Bodies in one jurisdiction may sub-contract testing to laboratories in the other. C. The 1997 MRA Negotiations. U.S.-EC negotiators initially discussed negotiating mutual recognition arrangements in eleven sectors, but ultimately whittled this down to the following six: telecommunications equipment, electromagnetic compatibility, electrical safety, recreational craft, medical devices, and pharmaceutical good manufacturing practices. As with all trade negotiations, the EC and United States were concerned that the final results either favor their export industries or be "balanced." The United States wished to conclude an agreement on telecommunications equipment first, but the EC refused because it felt that U.S. firms would benefit more if the agreement covered only this sector. The EC used its political leverage by threatening not to sign any MRA involving telecommunications equipment without inclusion of MRAs covering medical devices and pharmaceutical good manufacturing practices.
The MRA negotiations required the involvement of multiple executive agencies since the negotiations comprised an overall framework agreement and six annexes covering the six separate sectors. The Office of the United States Trade Representative and the Commission's Trade Directorate-General (DG) led the negotiations of the MRA framework agreement. 47 Each of the annexes, however, was negotiated by the regulatory agency responsible for the sector concerned. On the European side, this was a simpler process because of the centralization of the responsible agency officials within the Commission's DG Enterprise and these officials' long experience with coordinating the twin goals of regulatory protection and free trade within the single market. Because of this dual role, DG Enterprise officials are, in some ways, more analogous to the U.S. Department of Commerce than to independent U.S. regulatory agencies. On the U.S. side, in contrast, separate independent federal agencies negotiated the annexes. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) handled the telecommunications and electromagnetic compatibility annexes; the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), a division of the Department of Labor, negotiated the electrical safety annex; the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) negotiated the annexes for medical devices and pharmaceutical good manufacturing practices; and the Coast Guard oversaw the recreational craft annex. These U.S. agencies traditionally have focused only on protecting public health and safety, and thus were less receptive to arguments concerning trade facilitation.
The involvement of both trade officials and regulatory officials resulted in intra-U.S. agency conflicts, as well as transatlantic ones. Trade officials more aggressively pushed for an agreement, and U.S. regulatory officials, in particular the FDA and OSHA, were reticent about accepting foreign certification of safety standards. Since these agencies are relatively independent compared to their EC counterparts, they obstructed agreement where they believed that their regulatory missions might be compromised. In the fall of 1996, negotiations almost broke down over inclusion of the medical device and pharmaceutical annexes. 48 54 See e.g. Giandomenico Majone, 265-266 Regulating Europe (1996) (maintaining, in the EC context, that "agency independence is…the necessary condition for a reform of the regulatory process in the direction of a co-ordinated partnership among national and European authorities."). 55 A single product may be covered by more than one annex. For example, some telecommunication equipment may be subject to the annexes on telecommunication equipment, electromagnetic compatibility, and electrical safety. 56 The sole minor exception to date is the mutual recognition agreement on marine equipment initialed in June 2001. these assessment evaluations are subject to varying pre-approval and post-approval conditions. 57 For example, in the case of medical devices, the relevant agencies need not accept the tests from foreign certification bodies if they find the reports deficient and delineate why, thus reducing businesses' incentives to use these bodies. In the case of pharmaceutical good manufacturing practices, the tests are performed by regulatory bodies, and not private laboratories, and again, the agency in the importing jurisdiction may reject reports where it finds them deficient.
The MRA sets up a new transatlantic structure for overseeing its implementation. First, the MRA creates a Joint Committee, which consists of U.S. and EC trade officials who meet twice annually. Second, the annexes create Joint Sectoral Committees to oversee the annexes' implementation. The Joint Sectoral Committees are of greatest importance for implementing the MRA since they consist of the actual regulatory authorities who must oversee the protection of health and safety on each side of the Atlantic. However, in some cases, these regulatory authorities are not effectively collaborating, as examined in the more detailed assessments of the six sectors.
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As of September 2002, only the three annexes of greatest initial interest to U.S. negotiators were fully operational-those covering telecommunications equipment, electromagnetic compatibility and recreational craft. 59 In contrast, implementation of the annexes for electrical safety equipment, medical devices and pharmaceutical good manufacturing practices remain in dispute. The transitional period for the medical device annex was extended for two years. Regarding the pharmaceutical annex, the FDA maintained that it was willing to recognize the "equivalency" of only two member state regulatory systems by the end of the 2001 transition period, and it set no fixed date for reviewing the others. 60 The EC, which must act on behalf of all fifteen member states, rejected this offer because it would prejudice manufacturers in the other thirteen member states, who would still be subject to duplicative EC and FDA inspections. 61 The EC's negotiation stance has been complicated by the fact that the U.S. executive has less control over independent agencies such as the FDA and OSHA. The Commission, displeased that the unimplemented annexes are those that the EC initially imposed as conditions for the 1997 MRA, is reviewing its options, including termination of the entire MRA, or suspension or withdrawal from certain of the agreements. In May 2002, the EC indicated that it was "likely to suspend participation in the agreement [ The telecommunications and electromagnetic compatibility annexes should be viewed together because they both involve telecommunications equipment and their inclusion was sought by the telecommunications industry. These annexes' complementarity is reflected structurally, in that the parties have formed a "Joint Sectoral Committee," consisting of members of the U.S. Federal Communications Commission and the EC's DG Enterprise to monitor the annexes' implementation. 64 Under both annexes, the parties agree to recognize test reports and conformity assessment certificates issued by Conformity Assessment Bodies located in the exporting jurisdiction, "without any further conformity assessment." 65 As with all of the annexes, however, assessments are made in respect of the standards and in accordance with the procedures of the importing jurisdiction.
Both annexes are now operational and, compared to the other annexes, their implementation has been relatively successful. 66 Nonetheless, these annexes themselves have become less important than when originally negotiated, since the EC has moved to a system of manufacturer self-certification for telecommunications equipment. In 1998, the EC Council enacted a new directive concerning telecommunications equipment pursuant to which manufacturers now may self-certify that their equipment complies with EC requirements. 67 Similarly, in regards to electromagnetic compatibility, firms must prepare files on which EC "competent bodies" state "opinions," but these bodies do not prepare assessment certificates. ) (noting that an FDA official claims that "the Commission, in fact, appears to have a certain 'ambivalence' about the agreement because it fears that the FDA will find that the pharmaceutical GMPs within the EU are internally inconsistent"). 64 Different units of DG Enterprise are responsible for implementation of all internal "single market" directives concerning industrial products, so that DG Enterprise is the European counterpart of U.S. regulatory authorities in these domains. 65 In addition, under the telecommunications annex, both parties agree to recognize quality assurance certificates of the other body. This function is not included in the Electromagnectic Compatibility Annex since it is not required in Europe. Telephone interview with Joe Dhillon, of the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) of the U.S. Department of Commerce, June 7, 2001. See compare list of functions in Section III of both annexes. 66 The responsible authority within each exporting jurisdiction (U.S. federal or EC member state) is to designate the Conformity Assessment Bodies located within it. These designations have been accomplished without controversy, unlike for other MRA annexes. As of June 2001, the United States had designated twenty-three Conformity Assessment Bodies for telecommunications equipment, and forty-three for electromagnetic compatibility. Interview with Joe Dhillon, supra note..., June 7, 2001. EC member states had designated a similar number of Conformity Assessment Bodies for electromagnetic equipment, but fewer for telecommunications equipment, in light of the shift in the EC toward self-certification of compliance with telecommunication standards. See list available at Mutual Recognition Agreements (visited March 7, 2002) <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/international/indexb1.htm#intro>. 67 Directive 98/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 1998 relating to telecommunications terminal equipment and satellite earth station equipment, including the mutual recognition of their conformity, and interpretation thereof. Under this directive, firms only need to consult with outside testing bodies. These bodies must maintain a record for post-market surveillance purposes, but they do not issue pre-market assessment certificates. See e.g. Annex IX of the 1998 Telecom Directive, supra note... 68 Competent bodies are similar to notified bodies, but issue only opinions as opposed to assessment certificates. The EC's move to manufacturer self-certification has been much more dramatic for access to the EC market than the MRA itself. Telecommunications firms now lobby U.S. authorities to adopt the EC's decentralized system, viewing the MRA as a potential catalyst for U.S. domestic regulatory change. 69 2. Electrical Safety: Regulatory Tensions. For EC authorities, the (at least relative) success of the telecommunications and EMC annexes has been undermined by the United States' failure (on account of OSHA) to implement the electrical safety annex, which, in the EC's view, is also necessary for EC telecommunications and other firms to gain freer access to the U.S. market. EC negotiators insisted that the MRA include an annex concerning electrical safety standards because the EC market has long been relatively deregulated and thus more open to U.S. products. In contrast, the U.S. system calls for regulatory reviews and approvals by OSHA, a division of the U.S. Department of Labor. EC authorities, acting on behalf of EC firms, desired to ease the regulatory burden for EC imports into the U.S. market that required OSHA approvals.
70 They hoped to do so by having OSHA recognize product testing and certification, under OSHA standards by Conformity Assessment Bodies located in Europe. In addition, at least certain sectors of the telecommunications industry desired an MRA that covered not only all aspects of telecommunications product approvals, but also might lead to adoption within the United States of a decentralized EC system.
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This annex has not been implemented, however, because of disputes with OSHA over the designation of European Conformity Assessment Bodies. OSHA has found implementation of the MRA to be a "headache" since it has been pressed to accept, without significant review, applications forwarded to it by fifteen different member state authorities, all or part of which may be in any one of the EC's eleven official languages. 72 To ensure its regulatory mission, OSHA has insisted that it control the designation of European Conformity Assessment Bodies under the electrical safety equipment annex, rather than relying on European member state designations. OSHA has rejected a number of Conformity Assessment Bodies designated by member state authorities on different grounds, including on account of the language of the submission and the submission's incompleteness. 73 The Commission maintains that OSHA's assertion of control over the designation of European Conformity Assessment Bodies is in violation of the agreement's letter and spirit. . 72 OSHA has not wished to be forced to accept, without significant review, applications forwarded to it by fifteen different member state authorities, all or part of which may be in any one of the EC's eleven official languages. OSHA also has insisted that it conduct on-site reviews of these bodies. OSHA even began charging an application fee in October 2000 because of the burden of the application process, which further raised tensions with European regulatory authorities. Telephone interview with OSHA official, June 7, 2001. 73 Telephone interview with OSHA official, June 7, 2000. 74 The Electrical Safety annex reads that European member state authorities (defined as "EC Designating Authorities," of which there is one for each state) "shall designate conformity assessment bodies located in the EC"
The tensions between OSHA and the Commission's enterprise directorate-general stem, in large part, from differences in U.S. and EC regulatory structure and culture in this specific area. Since the EC's 1973 Council Directive on electrical safety equipment, EC member states permit manufacturers to self-certify their compliance with EC electrical safety requirements, subject to post-marketing member state surveillance and controls. 75 The member states have agreed on the harmonization of approximately 600 standards for electrical safety equipment, which largely transpose international standards. 76 In contrast, all electrical safety equipment that may be used in the workplace in the United States must be approved by a laboratory recognized and overseen by OSHA, known as an NRTL (or Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratory). Under the U.S. system, workplace owners must comply with, and are reviewed under, OSHA electrical safety equipment requirements. 77 From the perspective of European regulators, the United States lacks the political will to provide for mutual recognition in this annex. As one Commission official states, "OSHA never wanted this annex and is not committed to it." 78 OSHA officials indirectly concur, arguing that this annex was included as a "political gesture" to the Europeans and the telecommunications industry." 79 U.S. and EC regulatory authorities are now skeptical of the benefits of the electrical safety MRA. According to one Commission official, this MRA annex has been "counterproductive" for overall efforts at U.S.-EC regulatory cooperation. 80 Another Commission official claims that the EC may exercise its right not to apply the other MRAs on account of OSHA's alleged violations of the agreement. and that "OSHA shall rely on [these EC designating authorities] for conducting on-site reviews at the respective Member States' conformity assessment bodies." The same article provides, however, that OSHA shall "give notice of its consent or objection to a proposed conformity assessment body... within 120 business days," implying that OSHA has the final say over these bodies' designation. Section VI of the Annex further provides that OSHA shall determine "whether the proposal is complete... and give notice of its consent or objection." OSHA returned all three applications on the grounds that they were insufficient, either because they needed to be translated, or because more information was required. Once OSHA accepts an EC-designated conformity assessment body, that body "shall have NRTL status in the US" for U.S. regulatory purposes. A NRTL, or Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratory, refers to a laboratory that has been recognized by OSHA. Under the MRA, EC Conformity Assessment Bodies are to recognized as NRTLs. Similarly, a U.S.-designated conformity assessment body "shall have Notified Body status within the EC." 75 EC member state regulatory authorities coordinate a system of post-market surveillance in which they interact via periodic meetings and regular e-mail and telephone contact. For example, they exchange information to implement sales bans of at least three hundred electrical safety products per year. EC authorities believe that member state regulators interact at least as much as local OSHA representatives in the U.S. context. Interview with representative of DG Enterprise, June 13, 2001 . 76 Approximately 90% of these standards are set by the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). Interview with Commission representative in DG Trade, June 13, 2001. 77 From a U.S. perspective, the EC never understood the differences in OSHA's approach to certification, which regulates based on a locale, rather than a specific product, since it is the workplace owner that must comply with, and is reviewed under, OSHA requirements. negotiate and implement from the perspective of the regulators on either side of the Atlantic. In the United States, the applicable regulatory body, the U.S. Coast Guard, already permitted firms to self-certify their products, so that there was no need for any European conformity assessment bodies. In contrast, products must be certified by a "notified body" within the EC, so that European recognition of U.S. Conformity Assessment Bodies could (at least in theory) reduce costs for U.S. firms. However, U.S. firms have largely continued to use pre-existing subcontracting arrangements for European product certification. 82 4. Medical Devices: Disappointment and Delay. The United States and EC agreed to include the annexes for medical devices and pharmaceutical good manufacturing practices in the MRA only after the EC, U.S. trade officials, business lobbyists and Congress placed considerable pressure on a reticent FDA. 83 Although the medical device annex was eventually included, the FDA insisted that the annex's coverage be more limited, even though the parties only agreed to mutually recognize testing reports and not each other's standards. First, the medical device annex only applies to less stringently regulated medical devices, subject to possible expansion based on an FDA "pilot program."
84 Second, designated Conformity Assessment Bodies are not selected by an authority of the exporting country, but rather by "joint assessment." 85 Third, implementation of the Annex was made subject to a three-year transition period (to have ended in December 2001), during which the FDA organized a "joint confidence building program." In the fall of 2001, the parties agreed to extend this transition period for a further two years. 86 Fourth, designated Conformity Assessment Bodies are not permitted to perform all tests contemplated by the MRA, but only those in which the regulatory authority determines that they are competent. 87 Fifth, while the annex uses the terminology of "Conformity Assessment Bodies," domestic regulatory bodies retain ultimate authority to recognize the testing results. 88 . 88 Articles 11 and 12 of the annex provide that "reports prepared by the CABS listed as equivalent will normally be for regulatory authorities, but do not make definitive determinations for marketing purposes. In addition, regulators must create a transatlantic "alert system" and exchange "post-market vigilance reports" as integral parts of the program.
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Implementation of even this relatively limited MRA program nonetheless has encountered serious obstacles. The primary difficulty lies in the wariness of the FDA, stemmed in large part by the very different nature of the U.S. and EC regulatory systems. The European regulatory system for medical devices is much more decentralized under the EC's "new" and "global" approaches. 90 Firms are offered a choice in the EC of how to meet EC "essential requirements," which choice varies depending on the product and its risk. 91 In contrast, the U.S. system is more heavily regulated, as the FDA often requires (depending on the product) both quality systems evaluations (which it terms "surveillance/post-market and initial/pre-approval inspection reports") and pre-market product evaluation reports (which it calls "510(k) reports").
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Even under the FDA's new pilot program with private laboratories, the FDA retains ultimate authority over whether or not to accept laboratory reports or to require further information or testing, so that reliance on private laboratory certification is not automatic.
5. Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices (GMPs): FDA Reticence. The least ambitious and furthest from implementation of the six annexes is that for Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices. "Good manufacturing practices," at least as defined by the EC, are those aspects "of quality assurance which ensures that products are consistently produced and controlled to quality standards." 93 The parties' intention in the pharmaceutical GMPs annex, the endorsed by the importing Party, except under specific and delineated circumstances" (listing a number of examples). 89 See Article 20 of the medical device annex. 90 See supra note… (re new and global approaches to EC regulations). . 91 Increasingly, EC firms appear to choose quality systems evaluations pursuant to which notified bodies evaluate the overall manufacturing process, and not specific products. Interview with Commission official from DG Enterprise, June 16, 2001 (pointing out that enterprises producing a range of products tend to prefer a quality system evaluation approach. Since quality system evaluations are also based on international ISO 9000 standards, firms selling in foreign markets may also benefit from them. Those manufacturers that produce only a single product line predominantly for the EC market may continue to prefer what the EC refers to as "type examination and verification reports."). Chai notes that "Mandatory individual device review under the EU system is necessary only for the devices with the highest risk potential." Chai, Medical Device Regulation, supra note.. , at 68. 92 As Chai notes, "Most Class II devices are subject to the 510(k) premarket notification-the process to verify the substantial equivalence of a product to a predicate device in terms of its safety and effectiveness. The United States' definition is more verbose, and covers "the requirements found in the respective legislations, regulations, and administrative provisions for methods to be used in, and the facilities or controls to be used for the manufacturing, processing, packing, and/or holding of a drug to assure that such drug meets the requirements as to safety, and has the identity and strength, and meets the quality and purity characteristics that it purports or is represented to possess." Both of these definitions are included in article 1.3 of the annex, with the indication "The only annex not to rely on private Conformity Assessment Bodies, 94 is to permit regulatory authorities on one side of the Atlantic to rely on regulatory authorities on the other to conduct on-site visits of manufacturing facilities. After the inspection, the foreign regulatory authority is to provide an inspection report regarding the manufacturers' compliance with good manufacturing practices. 95 These inspection reports should "normally be endorsed by the authority of the importing authority, except under specific and delineated circumstances."
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The pharmaceutical annex originally was, in large part, an agreement to agree, since many of the key provisions required further drafting. Initially, the parties could not even agree on a definition of good manufacturing practices, noting definitions from each of their legislative texts and adding that "the US and EC have agreed that the parties will "revisit this" issue. 97 Similarly, the parties left open the content of their programs "for assessing equivalence," 98 as well as the content of the "information which must be present in inspection reports." 99 However, in each case, these issues apparently have been resolved, with the parties agreeing to retain their own inspection forms listing the items that the other party's regulatory authority must evaluate and the information that it must provide.
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The "cornerstone" of the pharmaceutical GMP annex is each parties' determination of the equivalence of the regulatory system of the other party, which they "aimed" to conclude by December 31, 2001 . 101 The FDA, however, refused to recognize the equivalence of all but two member state systems, and thus the agreement was not implemented by the agreed date. The FDA faces a much more burdensome task to implement the MRA than do its European counterparts, who only need to adapt to one additional regulatory authority. In the FDA's view, to determine equivalence, it must review not only multiple EC directives and related EC documents, but also each member state's implementing legislation, regulatory structures and regulatory practices. 102 The FDA requires that it engage in joint training and joint inspections . 94 The pharmaceutical GMP annex is the only annex not to be based on the use of private Conformity Assessment Bodies, since public authorities alone certify pharmaceutical manufacturers' GMPs on each side of the Atlantic under relevant U.S. and EC legislation. Thus, the annex provides for "inspection reports generated by authorities" (i.e. public ministries), provided that the parties deem them to be equivalent "in terms of quality assurance of the products and consumer protection" (article 6). 95 These could be "pre-approval inspections" (i.e. before a product is first marketed) or "post-approval inspections" (i.e. after a product is first marketed). 96 101 See article 2 (Purpose). In other words, the agreement itself does not recognize the "equivalence" of the parties' regulatory systems for purposes of evaluating "good manufacturing practices," but rather provides for a three-year transitional period during which the parties' regulatory authorities aimed to make this determination. 104 Unlike the 1997 Mutual Recognition Agreement and its six annexes, this new agreement provides for mutual recognition of each parties' standards and procedures as "equivalent" for purposes of certifications issued by conformity assessment bodies located in either parties' territory. 105 Although the initialed annex only covered five marine products, the parties plan to expand this list before they submit the agreement for final adoption under their respective legislative and administrative procedures. Pre-existing harmonization of standards in this sector, agreed under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in Geneva, made possible the parties' mutual recognition of the "equivalence" of each other's standards. This new mutual recognition agreement should be much easier to implement because testing bodies will not be certifying under separate standards and procedures, and thus less training and information exchange is required. Moreover, the parties agreed up-front to recognize each other's existing certification bodies so that no applications are required for implementation. 107 Thus, while this agreement is relatively narrow in product coverage, it is much broader in scope.
IV. The 1997 MRA in Context: Multi-level Business Strategies, Divergent
Regulatory Cultures, Unexpected Market Barriers A. The 1997 MRA in the Context of Domestic and Global Business Strategies. Bilateral regulatory cooperation cannot be viewed outside of domestic and global business strategies. At the domestic level, trading firms hope that the MRA will promote domestic adoption of harmonized standards, on the one hand, and deregulated certification requirements, on the other. Firms' main target has been U.S. independent regulatory authorities. They have had some success. Since 1998, the FCC has instituted a new program pursuant to which private testing laboratories may certify new telecommunications equipment, whereas formerly only the FCC could do so.
108 With business's encouragement, the EC has moved even further in some sectors, permitting manufacturer self-certification of most telecommunications equipment since 1998. Also since 1998, the FDA has instituted a program for private testing and certification of large categories of medical devices, starting with a pilot program that it plans to expand. As John Chai notes, U.S. manufacturers saw the EC system as a friendlier one in which to launch new products 103 In the words of one FDA official, FDA has "refused to compromise its mission of protecting public health for balance of trade purposes. 107 See article 6 of the MRA for Marine Equipment. 108 Since the MRA telecommunications and eletromagnetic compatibility annexes rely on recognition of foreign Conformity Assessment Bodies, the United States (at a minimum) needed to adopt a program permitting the use of private testing laboratories were it to enter into the MRA. and urged Congress and the FDA to adopt many of its flexible features. Allegedly, some "U.S. manufacturers were moving their capital, resources, and facilities to Europe" as a result. 109 In response to primarily domestic demands, the FDA Modernization Act expressly authorized the FDA to rely on private testing bodies in its oversight of medical devices.
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Although the original goal of the MRA annexes may have been to facilitate transatlantic trade, firms simultaneously focused on the deregulation of domestic product approvals.
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112 Firms are primarily interested in reducing costs and getting new products to market in a rapidly changing technological environment. 113 A primary means to do so is to reduce pre-marketing regulatory requirements. The 1997 MRA annexes for telecommunications equipment and electromagnetic compatibility facilitated advancement of businesses' regulatory objectives. Many telecommunications firms continue to hope that the relevant U.S. agency, OSHA, 114 might relax its pre-market controls of electrical safety equipment by adopting a system of self-certification used in the EC since 1973.
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As for Europe, U.S. firms hope to use transatlantic proposals for regulatory cooperation to change EC and member state legislative and regulatory procedures. In this case, firms would prefer that Europe adopt more of a U.S. procedural model, as set forth in U.S. administrative 113 Firms, of course, also maintain that such regulatory flexibility, in turn, benefits consumers on account of enhanced innovation and competition. 114 Telephone interview with representative of Underwriters Laboratories, Oct. 17, 2002. OSHA has long been challenged by U.S. business, which has been partially successful in preventing OSHA from efficiently doing its job. As Terry Moe writes, "Interest groups representing business actually did participate in the design of OSHA,... [and] OSHA is an administrative nightmare, in large measure because some of its influential designers fully intended to endow it with structures that would not work. 118 The United States, in this case, has taken up TABD's proposals in the negotiation of a U.S.-EC agreement on regulatory cooperation and transparency. In a 2001 draft, the United States proposed addressing "transparency" in regulatory processes through such mechanisms as "notice and comment rulemaking procedures," mandatory assessments of the "potential benefits, costs and other impacts for all parties, domestic and non-domestic," "public explanations... for the proposal and the alternatives," and "access to documents containing supporting research, data and analysis." 119 Businesses also view transatlantic mutual recognition agreements in a global context. Firms, together with some government representatives, hope that transatlantic arrangements may be a stepping stone for reaching mutual recognition agreements with third countries, thereby offering increased access to lucrative Asian and South American markets. 120 The WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade and the General Agreement on Trade in Services explicitly encourage and lend legal support to the expansion of transatlantic MRAs. 121 Under WTO rules, countries that do not "give mutual satisfaction" to third countries offering "equivalent" procedures or standards are subject to WTO anti-discrimination claims under WTO most-favored nations clauses.
122 While the prospect of these claims remains relatively remote at this stage, business organizations, such as the TABD, already can use the WTO agreements as additional leverage.
Much more importantly than potential legal claims, each new mutual recognition agreement places pressure on third countries to enter into negotiations so that their firms are not disadvantaged-what Kalypso Nicolaidis refers to as a potential "contagion effect." The Government Performance and Results Act requires agencies to justify funding that they receive, with the implied threat that funding will be reduced if they do not perform efficiently (a form of agency cost/benefit analysis). 117 TABD, 2001 Mid Year Report, supra note...,at 14. 118 Id., at 16 (also adding "Business consultation and the consultation of other interested stakeholders should be part of the assessment process"). In addition, TABD proposes that all regulation be subject to a separate "'trade impact statement' at the cost-benefit analysis phase of regulatory activities and in the development of legislation. leverage to domestic firms to demand new MRAs (with transatlantic or third country counterparts, as the case may be) to equalize market access. The telecommunications industry has sought MRAs for other lucrative markets in Asia and Latin America, which U.S. and EC authorities respectively have signed through APEC and CITEL. 124 The EC has signed MRAs with Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, Switzerland and New Zealand, in addition to those signed with the United States. 125 The transatlantic MRA can, in this way, be seen as a step for the extension of MRAs globally, helping ensure that not only transatlantic markets, but also other foreign markets, will remain open to foreign entry.
Business' global and domestic strategies are interlinked. The telecommunications industry, in particular, has promoted global and U.S. regulatory change toward the EC's selfcertification model. If the industry can spur further regulatory change in the United States, it will increase its leverage in using the transatlantic MRA as a catalyst for its global deregulatory strategies. 126 The EC and United States are in the process of implementing or negotiating MRAs for the telecommunications sector throughout the world.
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B. The Challenge of Implementation: Reconciling Regulatory Systems and Cultures. The significant institutional asymmetries between the United States' and EC's respective regulatory systems and cultures creates a major challenge for transatlantic regulatory cooperation and the implementation of transatlantic mutual recognition agreements. Where regulators adopt similar regulatory structures and systems, and enact similar substantive standards, they more easily understand and accept each other's regulatory determinations. Regulatory symmetry facilitates regulatory trust and confidence, enabling regulatory cooperation to occur. For example, U.S. and EC regulatory authorities each have supported a more decentralized process for pre-marketing approvals of telecommunications equipment, which explains the relative ease of this annex's implementation.
Although the U.S. system is often characterized as fragmented and decentralized, its actual nature varies by sector. At times, the U.S. system is relatively highly centralized, as when Congress delegates regulatory authority to an independent federal regulatory body, such as the FDA.
128 At other times, the U.S. system is more fragmented, with regulation consisting of a patchwork of federal, state, and private voluntary standards with no overarching framework, as in the case of data privacy protection. 129 Significant for transatlantic mutual recognition agreements, U.S. private standard-setting bodies remain highly fragmented, since the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), which is the closest analogue to a U.S. national standards body, does not serve as an administrator or coordinator of private standard-setting. 130 While some commentators maintain that the United States grants private actors relatively more flexibility than in Europe, 131 this stereotype is belied in practice by a number of the sectors covered by the 1997 MRA. For example, the FCC certified all telecommunications equipment until the negotiation of the transatlantic MRA, at which time it adopted a more decentralized EC model. The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration requires OSHA-accredited laboratories to certify all electrical safety equipment used in the workplace, whereas the EC has permitted manufacturers to self-certify the equipment's conformity with EC requirements since 1973. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration continues to certify most medical devices, 132 whereas EC authorities have permitted testing by private notified bodies since 1994. 133 U.S. and EC regulators work in different regulatory cultures, ones which (in the case of the MRA) makes EC institutional adaptation easier. EC and European national regulators operate under the dual mission of ensuring free trade within the internal market, on the one hand, while ensuring public safety through high product and process standards, on the other. They thus are quite accustomed to interacting with foreign regulators and testing bodies on an on-going basis. Consequently, the Commission's DG Enterprise and DG Trade units rarely tousled when negotiating and implementing the 1997 Mutual Recognition Agreement. In contrast, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration traditionally has defined its role solely as that of protecting U.S. public health, and has not operated under a dual mission of also facilitating market exchange. Although FDA officials participate in the International Conference on Harmonization and although Congress expanded the FDA's mission in 1998 to include trade facilitation, 134 FDA authorities have developed U.S. standards and procedures over time in relative isolation from other regulators. FDA officials often consider their practices as superior, constituting what the FDA's General Counsel has characterized as "the gold standard." 135 Because the FDA is an independent regulatory authority anxious to protect its regulatory autonomy, U.S. trade and commerce authorities encounter more difficulties in negotiating bilateral agreements concerning areas within the FDA's jurisdiction. Because of OSHA's and FDA's wariness of relinquishing regulatory controls, the United States and EC have so far been unable to implement the MRAs for electrical safety equipment, medical devices and pharmaceutical good manufacturing practices.
Implementation of transatlantic MRAs also has been much easier for the EC because EC regulatory authorities only have to adapt to one new regulatory system (the United States') that is overseen in one language (English), whereas U.S. authorities must adapt to fifteen different regulatory structures operating in eleven different languages within the EC. EC regulatory authorities already are accustomed to dealing with other national regulators in the context of the EC's single market. Member state regulators are well-accustomed to working in English, the language in which U.S. certification bodies will submit their applications and testing reports. 136 Expansion of the EC system to include the United States is a less significant change for them.
C. The Unexpected Challenge of Market Barriers to Implementation. Transatlantic trade officials and businesses that first touted the benefits of U.S.-EC mutual recognition arrangements now realize their underestimation of the difficulties of implementation. These constraints involve not just regulators and regulatory cultures, but market forces as well. The market has not reacted favorably to the recognition of new Conformity Assessment Bodies under the 1997 MRA.
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From the perspective of manufacturers, they typically develop long-term working relationships with certifying laboratories, which constitute a form of cost-effective firm-laboratory partnership. Because manufacturers invest in educating these laboratories about their products and manufacturing processes, and the relationship of these products and processes to applicable regulatory requirements, the cost of changing laboratories may be significant. Moreover, a laboratory's mark itself may be important in some markets, so that firms may continue obtaining formal certification from EC notified bodies for the EC market and U.S. laboratories for the United States. As a result, most firms may continue using the same laboratories even though these laboratories cannot directly certify products as Conformity Assessment Bodies, but must work through sub-contracting arrangements with accredited laboratories on the other side of the Atlantic. 138 Similarly, laboratories will not invest in the accreditation procedures required to become a Conformity Assessment Body if they fear that the prospects for future profitable business are too uncertain. Accreditation costs can be substantial, involving seminars, workshops, training programs, audits and joint inspections with authorities across the Atlantic. While twelve European notified bodies initially applied to be recognized as Conformity Assessment Bodies under the medical device annex, two subsequently withdrew on account of costs.
139 Private laboratories and manufacturing firms have become, in the words of one Commission official, "a bit cool on the MRA."
140 This industry reaction, in turn, suits those regulators who were not enthusiastic about the MRA in the first place. The MRA's success, in consequence, may require considerable market promotion, including through government subsidies and promotional programs. As Commission representatives assert, "the MRA should contain sufficient commercial incentives for potential CABs [Conformity Assessment Bodies] and industry to show interest. Use of the MRA cannot be imposed." 141 The Transatlantic Business Dialogue supports such promotional efforts.
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Some domestic firms, however, also benefit from domestic regulatory barriers to their transatlantic competitors. When no domestic business constituency actively presses for domestic regulatory change, implementation of an MRA faces greater hurdles. For example, no U.S. constituency is pressing for implementation of the electrical safety MRA. 143 As a Commission official points out, this is not a "balanced" MRA, since U.S.-based firms do not require conformity assessment to sell electrical safety equipment in the EC market. 144 In addition, most U.S. producers encounter relatively less difficulty with OSHA's program because of their experience with OSHA-certified laboratories, and thus may gain an advantage against European competitors. Similarly, laboratories already certified by OSHA have a relatively protected market. They would not benefit from new competition from laboratories certified by European authorities. 145 Thus, there is little U.S. constituent pressure on OSHA to concede to the EC and recognize laboratories designated by EC member state authorities. -based firms may self-certify that they will abide by the Principles. In doing so, they may avoid European restrictions on data transfers to the United States imposed pursuant to EC law. 147 The Principles constitute a unique development in the governance of U.S.-EC economic relations. To some, they represent the EC's exercise of coercive market power in an extraterritorial fashion in an attempt to leverage up privacy standards within the United States. 148 To others, they represent a capitulation by EC market approval process by permitting manufacturer self-certification. If this occurs, however, the electrical safety annex's provision of mutual recognition of testing bodies would have served little purpose other than (possibly) to help foment U.S. domestic regulatory change. 147 The agreement was formalized through an exchange of letters between Robert LaRussa, the And finally, to some, including this author, they represent a compromise through new institutional development pursuant to which free transatlantic information flows may be preserved while satisfying legitimate EC concerns. The EC is justifiably wary of the export of personal information concerning EC residents in a technology-intensive, interdependent globalizing economy.
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Unlike the mutual recognition agreements assessed above, the Safe Harbor Principles constitute a loose form of de facto harmonization of social standards. The Principles go beyond current regulatory requirements in the United States, and thereby constitute a regulatory floor with which trading firms must comply if they wish to receive data from Europe without threat of challenge. This harmonization, however, is designed to affect only trading firms, and otherwise to create no legal obligations within the United States. The United States and EC may thereby claim that they formally retain autonomy to enact whatever privacy legislation they deem appropriate. However, any firm that engages in cross-border exchange is subject to pressure to abide by the Principles. In this way, Europe's regulatory approach may have spillover effects within the United States, leading to some convergence in data privacy practices, despite differing U.S. and EC regulatory systems.
Although the extent of the Safe Harbor Principles' implementation remains an open question, the U.S.-EC dispute and efforts at cooperation demonstrate the inherent interrelation between social regulation and open trade policies where regulation (or the lack thereof) has external effects. Alleged U.S. under-regulation can jeopardize the privacy interests of EC residents. Alleged EC over-regulation can limit the commercial operations of U.S. enterprises. In an interdependent transatlantic economy, U.S. and EC authorities attempt to manage the ensuing conflicts of norms and interests, and mesh, where possible, their divergent regulatory systems.
A. Pooled Sovereignty: The EC's Market Clout in an Interdependent Transatlantic Economy. The U.S.-EC agreement was spurred by the creation of the EC single market, on the one hand, and the interdependent nature of the U.S. and European economies, on the other. The creation of the single market led to the EC's regulation of data privacy in the first place. Among the ironies inherent in the U.S.-EC dispute is that the original purpose of the EC's data privacy directive was not just to increase data privacy protection within the European Community. It was also to ensure the uninhibited flow of data within the EC from the threat of unilateral restrictions by individual EC member states on account of their differing data privacy protection regimes. Egan, Constructing a European Market, supra note..., at 131. Yet, this is an overstatement, for as shown above, the EC itself has adopted novel institutional means to reconcile free movement of goods and social protection through the EC's new and global approaches to harmonization, which include self-certification and oversight by selfregulatory organizations. 151 The Directive was negotiated within the context of the threat of data transfer bans from certain member states with protective data privacy laws (such as France and Germany) to other member states with less stringent laws (such as Italy). By requiring similar data privacy protection throughout the European Union, the Directive concurrently removed the threat to unhindered data flows between member states. To ensure the economic benefits of trade liberalization through the creation of a single market, EC member states collectively agreed to guarantee more stringent protections of data privacy. See Greg Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU The interlinked nature of social protection and liberalized trade in a single European market gave rise to the Directive.
Similarly, data privacy protection became a transatlantic issue because of the growing interdependence of the U.S. and European economies and the rising importance of information technology. U.S. affiliates in Europe produce over a trillion dollars of goods and services annually, constituting "over half of all the foreign production of U.S. companies."
152 These companies depend on information flows, not only with third party suppliers, customers, consultants, marketers and other service providers, but also internally, within their complex networks of affiliates, joint ventures and partnerships.
The U.S.-EC dispute over the adequacy of U.S. data privacy protection affects U.S. privacy policies and practices because the EC exercises political and market power. In a globalizing marketplace, the EC's single market initiative has reinforced the European Commission's position as a global actor. 153 The EC's huge internal market enables the Commission to exercise considerable political clout in the negotiation of international and transatlantic rules, including harmonized rules governing firm behavior.
The shift of European regulation to the EC level has strengthened the EC's ability to represent the interests of its constituents vis-a-vis the United States. The EC member states have not simply "lost" sovereignty in working through centralized EC authorities; they have reallocated it in a manner which effectively enhances their negotiating authority (and in that way their autonomy) vis-a-vis the United States. 154 In pooling their sovereignty, EC member states now speak with a more powerful voice transatlantically on economic regulatory matters. The timing of the United States' reaction to the threat of bans on data transfers from Europe demonstrates the EC's relative clout . It was not until the EC's privacy directive went into effect that U.S. authorities drafted Safe Harbor Principles and increased pressure on companies to raise their internal privacy standards. When the threat moved to the EC level, the United States took the threat more seriously. (May 7, 1998) . 153 The United States increasingly negotiates with the EC as an independent political institution apart from its fifteen member states. As Assistant Secretary of Commerce Franklin Vargo states, the New Transatlantic Agenda signed between the U.S. and EC in December 1995 "marks the first time that we are dealing with the EC as a political institution on a large scale." Id. 154 As Joel Trachtman states, "[s]overeignty, viewed as an allocation of power and responsibility, is never lost, but only reallocated." A "loss" of sovereignty "may be viewed as a question of what is received, and by whom, in exchange for a reduction in the state's sovereignty, rather than simply a question of whether sovereignty is reduced." Joel Trachtman, 'Reflections on the Nature of the State: Sovereignty, Power and Responsibility,' 20 CAN.-U.S. L. J. 399 (1994) . 155 The U.S. Department of Commerce issued its first draft "Safe Harbor Principles" in November 1998, within a month of the Directive becoming effective. These were opened for comments within the United States and negotiated for almost twenty months with the Commission before they were finalized and approved by the EC. The Safe Harbor Principles were approved by the Council of Ministers, but rejected by the European Parliament. However, under applicable EC law, Parliament's rejection did not affect the EC's acceptance of the Principles through the Commission's final decision.
Processing of Personal Data and the Free Movement of such Data
156 became effective. The EC, through its Directive, takes primarily a regulatory approach to data privacy protection, as opposed to private ordering through market processes. The Directive is noteworthy for its broad scope of coverage. Except for public security, criminal law and related exceptions, it covers all processing of all personal data by whatever means, and is not limited to action by government, business sector or field of use. 157 The Directive prohibits data controllers from processing information unless the individual "unambiguously" consents to the processing and that consent is informed.
158 Information subject to the most stringent controls includes "personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life."
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The Directive provides multiple means for enforcement. It requires member states to grant individuals a permanent right of access to obtain copies of the data about them and have it corrected or its use enjoined. 160 It obliges member states to provide a judicial remedy for infringements of data privacy rights, including the right to receive damages. 161 To support effective enforcement, each member state must designate an independent public authority "responsible for monitoring the application within its territory" of the Directive's provisions. 162 These supervisory authorities are to be granted significant powers, including the power to investigate processing operations, to deliver "opinions before processing operations are carried out," to order "the blocking, erasure or destruction of data," to impose "a temporary or definitive ban on processing," and "to engage in legal proceedings" against violators of the rights guaranteed by the Directive. 163 The Directive also addresses the adequacy of foreign data protection law. It thus has explicit extraterritorial scope. Article 25 of the Directive provides that member states shall prohibit all data transfers to a third country if the Commission finds that the country does not ensure "an adequate level of protection" of data privacy. Pursuant to article 29 of the Directive, an EC Working Party prepared a series of documents that identified core principles under which the adequacy of a country's protections should be gauged. 164 These principles are in line with the EC's internal requirements and include the following: processing must be limited to a specific purpose made known to the concerned individual, together with other information to ensure fair processing; the individual must have access to the data and the right to object to its processing; the individual must have procedural mechanisms available to effectively enforce the protections.
In contrast to the EC, the United States has stressed "self-regulation" by the private sector backed by regulation which tends to be sector-specific and less stringent. Congress' targeting of specific sectors and concerns is reflected in such statutory titles as The Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, and the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988. 165 Overall, the U.S. 166 To a certain extent, the United States' handling of data privacy issues reflects Americans' traditional distrust of a centralized government.
167 U.S. legislation provides citizens with significantly greater protection against the collection and use of personal information by government, in particular the federal government, than by the private sector. 168 Since it appeared that the United States might not provide for "adequate" data privacy protection under the Directive's criteria, U.S. and EC authorities engaged in intensive negotiations to avoid a ban on data flows to the United States. These negotiations culminated in the U.S.-EC understanding on Safe Harbor Principles pursuant to which, the EC agreed that the Principles only would address the adequacy of companies' data protection practices, and not those of the United States as a whole. 169 Under Safe Harbor, EC member states formally recognized that U.S. firms' adherence to the Principles would be sufficient to protect firms from EC member state challenge.
Member state authorities, however, retain jurisdiction to challenge transfers to firms that do not adopt the Safe Harbor Principles. Privacy rights associations can trigger these proceedings by filing claims with supervisory authorities. 170 Even before implementation of the Directive, data transfers to the United States were barred by British, French, German and Swedish courts and administrative authorities. 171 and The Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1971. In many cases, Congress has simply reacted to public scandals. In passing the Fair Credit Reporting Act, it responded "to consumer horror stories of dealings with credit reporting agencies." It enacted The Video Privacy Protection Act after the video rental records of Judge Robert Bork were published by a news reporter in the course of a campaign against his Supreme Court nomination. 166 The fragmented, decentralized nature of the U.S. regulatory process is described in STEVEN VOGEL, FREER MARKETS, MORE RULES: REGULATORY REFORM IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES, 217 (1996) . 167 See Robert Kagan, How Much Do National Styles of Law Matter, in REGULATORY ENCOUNTERS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM,( Robert Kagan & Lee Axelrod eds.2000), at 11. 168 The Privacy Act of 1974 is the only federal omnibus act that protects informational privacy. Yet despite the legislation's broad title, the Privacy Act only applies to data processing conducted by the federal government, not by state governments or private entities. The vast majority of states lack omnibus privacy acts, and rather offer scattered statutes applying to specific sectors or concerns Nonetheless, demands for privacy legislation covering the private sector within the United States have increased. With a change to a Republican administration, the FTC has backed away from recommending legislation. 169 In an attempt to ward off EC action, U.S. officials implicitly threatened to challenge any ban imposed by the EC before the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body. For example, Ira Magaziner, formerly responsible for U.S. discussions on electronic commerce issues, including privacy protection, stated that, "In general, we in the U.S. don't recognize an extra-territorial attempt to shut down the electronic flow of data between countries. According to principles of international trade, I think that's a violation of WTO rules." Kenneth Cukier, 'U.S. Under Fire over 'Aggressive' Net Tax Stance,' Comm. Wk. Int'l, March 2, 1998. However, WTO rules have shielded the EC from a U.S. retaliatory threat since the Directive arguably is in compliance with WTO rules. For an analysis of the Directive's extraterritorial scope under WTO law, see Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection, supra note…, at 46-55. 170 Privacy International, a London-based privacy organization, has threatened to file claims against American C. The Safe Harbor Program. Table 2 The Safe Harbor program sets forth seven core data privacy principles for industry to follow. Because the EC formally acknowledged the Principles as "adequate" under the Directive's criteria, the Principles provide U.S. businesses with a "safe harbor." The seven Principles are: (i) "Notice": An organization must provide "clear and conspicuous" notice to individuals "about the purposes for which it collects and uses information about them, how to contact the organization with... complaints, the types of third parties to which it discloses the information, and the... means... for limiting its use and disclosure"; (ii) "Choice": An organization must provide individuals with a "clear and conspicuous" choice to "opt out" of how their personal information may be used and to whom it may be disclosed; "for sensitive information (i.e, personal information specifying medical or health conditions, racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership or information specifying the sex life of the individual), they must be given affirmative or explicit (opt in) choice if the information is to be disclosed to a third party or used for a purpose other than those for which it was originally collected or substantively authorized..."; (iii) "Onward Transfer": To disclose information to a third party, an organization must apply the "Notice and Choice principles"; (iv) "Security": Organizations must take reasonable measures to protect information from disclosure, misuse, alteration or loss; (v) "Data Integrity": Organizations "may not process personal information in a way that is incompatible with the purposes for which it has been collected or subsequently authorized," and "take reasonable steps to ensure that data is... accurate, complete and current"; (vi) "Access": An organization must grant individuals access to personal information held about them and the opportunity to have it corrected, except where the burden would be disproportionate to the privacy risks in the case in question; (vii) "Enforcement": There must be "mechanisms for assuring compliance" and "consequences" for non-compliance, which must include "readily available and affordable independent recourse mechanisms" and "sanctions [that] must be sufficiently rigorous to ensure compliance."
The meaning of the principles is further specified in a document entitled 431, 438 (1995) An overview of the Safe Harbor Principles is set forth in Table 2 . Companies join the Safe Harbor program by annually certifying to the U.S. Department of Commerce that they will comply with the Principles. The Department of Commerce then places the company's name on its web site list of certifying firms. 172 The firms' primary benefit from certifying is that EC member states may not challenge them under member state law or otherwise condition any data transfers to them. U.S. law applies to the Principles' interpretation, and U.S. courts and administrative bodies hear all claims (although European courts and administrative bodies may still challenge the online collection of information from European residents by U.S.-based firms).
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Self-regulatory organizations (such as BBBOnLine and TRUSTe) , 174 backed by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, offer the primary means for the Principles' enforcement. In this way, the Principles' application resembles the EC's new and global approaches to internal market harmonization. 175 As under the new approach, the Safe Harbor Principles set forth "essential requirements" that firms (although in this case, only self-certified firms) must meet. As under the global approach, quasi-public-private bodies oversee their compliance. This oversight ultimately is backed by the authority of the state. If a company adopts the safe harbor principles and fails to comply with them, it subjects itself to challenge by the FTC for "using unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." 176 In a letter to the Commission date July 14, 2000, the FTC committed itself to "give priority to referrals of non-compliance with self-regulatory guidelines... [and] safe harbor principles" respectively referred to it from certifying organizations and EC member state authorities. As documented in this letter, the FTC has already brought enforcement actions against firms for failure to comply with their posted privacy policies. 177 In this backhanded way, the Directive informally shapes U.S. data privacy requirements, potentially 172 175 See supra notes [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] . 176 See Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6). The Safe Harbor Principles provide that where "an organization relies in whole or in part on self-regulation, its failure to comply with such selfregulation must also be actionable under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act." Cf Joel R Reidenberg, ECommerce and Trans-Atlantic Privacy, 38 HOUSTON L. REV. 717, 740-741 (2001) (questioning whether FTC has jurisdiction to protect foreign consumers). 177 In the fall of 1998, the FTC brought an enforcement action against Geocities, which has "one of the most popular sites on the Web," for having suggested that GeoCities was collecting personal information, when the personal information was rather going directly to third parties. In 1999, the FTC announced a second enforcement action against Liberty Financial Companies, Inc., operator of the Young Investor Web site, for falsely representing that information collected would be maintained anonymously. Another complaint was brought by the FTC against the online auction site ReverseAuction.com, which resulted in a consent agreement in January 2000. A description of these cases is set forth in Letter from the FTC to John Mogg, Director of DG Internal Market (formerly DG XV) of the European Commission, dated July 14, 2000. becoming a baseline standard. 178 Yet, it does so in a relatively flexible manner that respects U.S. legal sovereignty and use of private oversight bodies.
The Safe Harbor Principles should not be viewed in isolation, since the Directive provides other ways to comply with it, although these other means are typically more stringent. For example, in January 2002, the Commission approved standard contract clauses covering privacy protection that can be applied to all data transfers from the EC, regardless of a firm's adherence to the Safe Harbor Principles.
179 U.S. financial services firms were particularly interested in the content of this model contract since they currently are ineligible for certification under the Safe Harbor Principles because no U.S. authority (such as the FTC) has competence to enforce them. 180 When the draft model contract went beyond Safe Harbor requirements, the financial services industry reacted vehemently, pressuring the Treasury and Commerce Departments to send a joint letter to the Commission in protest, albeit to no avail. 181 Firms also can sign ad hoc contracts with individual member state data privacy authorities.
182 Alternatively, they can obtain the "unambiguous" consent of the "data subject" under the Directive, or sign contracts with affiliates or third parties when transferring personal information, in line with the Directive's requirements.
183
The Safe Harbor Principles are still at an inchoate stage so that it remains too early to assess their definitive impact. Some commentators have questioned the effectiveness of the Principles given that only a few U.S. companies initially signed them, and that the number of certified companies had only reached about two hundred and fifty as of October 2002. 184 A report of the Commission itself revealed serious flaws in the safe harbor agreement's implementation. 185 However, as practitioners point out, companies will not certify their procedures until their operations are in compliance. For large companies, this can involve considerable re-engineering of their information systems, creation of new internal policies, and training of personnel. 186 Moreover, many companies waited to see the content of the Commission's "model contract," which turned out to be more stringent than the Safe Harbor Principles themselves. 187 A Commission representative admits that the number of U.S. certifying companies "are disappointing," and that "it could be that companies feel there is a lack of enforcement of the EU data privacy law and therefore there is not a need to take part." 188 However, by 2002, the list of certified companies included major information technology companies such as Microsoft, Intel, Hewlett-Packard, Compaq, Acxiom and DoubleClick. In addition, the Commission started investigations of the practices of Microsoft and online music software companies, among others. 189 Although some companies initially hesitated certifying under the Safe Harbor Principles in order to avoid being subject to an FTC challenge within the United States, most large companies receiving data from Europe likely will not reason in this manner. They would prefer to be in legal compliance with EC rules on both reputational and legal grounds. 190 The Safe Harbor Principles are one way to proceed. Whether or not they certify to the Safe Harbor Principles, companies engaged in transatlantic business operate in the shadow of the Directive's potential enforcement. In this way, the EC Directive and Safe Harbor Principles can contribute to a gradual convergence in data privacy practices. Data privacy regulation in Europe has informed not only the tenor and context of debates in the United States; it has shaped interest groups' appreciation of their options. Under the Directive, U.S. businesses face potential litigation before European courts and administrative bodies unless they adhere to the Safe Harbor Principles. Playing off the U.S.-EC regulatory conflict and its media coverage, privacy advocates have increased pressure on U.S. federal and state politicians, regulatory authorities and businesses. Even though privacy advocates have criticized the Safe Harbor Principles, privacy advocates will use them as part of their larger strategies. 191 The context in which U.S. domestic debates over data privacy protection take place has been altered. The Directive, in particular, has increased the demand for legal, consulting and other privacy services within the United States. 192 The Better Business Bureau OnLine created a privacy seal program which incorporates the Safe Harbor Principles, and was revised to track "safe harbor" negotiations. 193 The Electronic Frontier Foundation, a San Francisco-based public interest organization, has associated with information technology companies to launch a program named TRUSTe to rate the privacy protection of Internet sites, which program is certified under Safe Harbor. 194 As smaller companies find these certification programs costly, trade associations such as the Direct Marketing Association designed their own enforcement programs for their members to comply with Safe Harbor requirements. 195 In adapting to the Safe Harbor Principles, many businesses have found that compliance actually entails minimum costs. Legislation, in this case foreign legislation, has helped raise the standards to be certified and spurred more companies to use seal programs with oversight and sanctioning mechanisms.
The Directive also has helped spur the creation of a new corporate position-the chief data privacy officer in companies' human resources divisions. These company employees attend conferences on the Directive and U.S. privacy legislation, write memoranda on privacy issues that they distribute within firms, and generally increase firm awareness of privacy issues. In formulating and overseeing the implementation of company policies, they foster company compliance with applicable legal requirements. Finally, outside law firms increasingly provide advice to firms regarding the Directive and the Safe Harbor Principles, thereby again promoting adaptation of U.S. business practice. This conjunction of lawyer, consultant and "privacy officer" advice, rendered in the context of the Safe Harbor Principles, can lead to some convergence of privacy policies over time, reducing the chance of a major transatlantic trade dispute over data privacy protection.
Concomitantly, in negotiating and operationalizing the Safe Harbor Principles, European officials have become more comfortable with the potential of U.S. governance approaches involving the use of private bodies, such as BBBOnLine, for the monitoring and certification of privacy practices. As Henry Farrell points out, European officials have indicated that they are willing to entertain the adaptation to the European context of less-centralized U.S. regulatory mechanisms for data protection. 196 The President of the European Parliament even called the Safe Harbor approach a "template for the future," serving as a potential model for regulation in other policy areas.
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D. Some Conclusions on Safe Harbor. While the Safe Harbor Principles do not formally apply to purely domestic data processing operations, U.S.-based enterprises recognize that it will be difficult for them to use two sets of data privacy practices, one for EC residents (providing for greater privacy protection), and one for U.S. residents (providing for less). Business databases will often include information about EC and U.S. residents, in which case businesses will be pushed to comply with the EC's more demanding requirements. 198 In addition, if businesses provide greater data privacy protection for EC residents than for U.S. residents, they may harm their public image. Privacy advocates have already exploited this argument, proclaiming that U.S. citizens should not be treated as second class citizens in their own country. 199 This move toward convergence, in practice, should help relieve cross-border regulatory conflicts.
Most importantly, in a world of increased economic interdependence, the Safe Harbor Principles point to the importance of regulatory cooperation across borders involving public and private actors. Certification groups such as BBBOnLine meet with European data protection officials so that they become comfortable in the workings of an alternative U.S. approach.
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These private groups also negotiate contracts for joint seal programs in other jurisdictions, such as that concluded in 2001 between BBBOnLine and a Japanese counterpart. 201 In this way, online businesses can meet criteria in multiple jurisdictions without the need for drawn-out treaty negotiations. Government officials realize that they do not have the resources to enforce the Directive's provisions solely on their own, and thus rely on public-private networks in an attempt to ensure better global practices affecting EC constituents. 202 The regulation of data privacy in a global economy will require the meshing of different regulatory systems and a commitment from the various actors to sustained interaction to ensure trust and confidence in each other's efforts.
From a practical standpoint, the goals of protecting individual privacy, on the one hand, while ensuring trade liberalization, on the other, are inseparable. Regulation in a jurisdiction with less stringent data privacy controls has significant externalities, thereby affecting residents in other jurisdictions. The Safe Harbor Principles are an example of an instrument for reconciling these regulatory concerns with the goals of liberalized trade. They represent a form of compromise that recognizes different institutional approaches and social values, yet nonetheless sets baseline rules where domestic values are affected by trade. 203 To make them work, however, will require sustained, cross-border cooperation. These new experiments in governance are a much preferred way to proceed than through litigation before a supranational court, such as the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body. New institutional development requires creative problemsolving and political will. The Safe Harbor Principles point to what-potentially-can be accomplished.
VI. Conclusions: The Prospects and Limits of U.S.-EC Bilateral Regulatory Cooperation
through Mutual Recognition Agreements: Moving Toward an EC System? A. Reasons for Enhanced Bilateral Regulatory Cooperation. Despite the significant difficulties of implementing the various U.S.-EC bilateral agreements, they also have created frameworks for interaction among regulatory officials who are responsible for protecting the health and safety of residents in an array of areas. Even if these transatlantic regulatory interactions result in tensions, blockages and obstacles, the concerned regulatory authorities also become more educated about each other's systems and are simultaneously initiating and pursuing various informal parallel programs which receive less attention than the conflicts, but may be more important in the long-term. Sustained regulatory encounters promoted by the various bilateral agreements ultimately are much more important than abstract undertakings to engage in regulatory cooperation. 204 This regulatory interaction, at least potentially, can lead to more protective social regulation and greater trade facilitation, both to consumers' benefit. First, regulatory exchange can spur improved social regulation, as authorities compare experiences and learn from each other's best practices. In a world characterized by rapid technological change under conditions of uncertainty, more sustained regulatory exchange can enhance informed decision-making. 205 FDA and member state regulatory officials, for example, meet to study their different evaluations of new products and the reasons why one authority may grant and the other withhold approval. They complement their reviews of market approvals with new joint alert and safeguard systems to more rapidly notify each other of risks that they encounter, and better coordinate procedures to address them. 206 Through these information exchanges, regulatory officials learn to build on each other's separate experiences, avoiding duplicative efforts so that they can target resources for other challenges. 207 Second, in some cases, regulatory exchange can lead to harmonized standards and procedures, which can help facilitate and spur further regulatory cooperation because officials more easily understand each other's systems and activities. Moreover, these harmonized standards and procedures can facilitate trade and competition by reducing production costs, since firms no longer need different product lines and product evaluation controls for multiple jurisdictions. 208 For example, increased interaction between the FDA and European regulators could facilitate transatlantic and international harmonization through the Global Harmonization Task Force. 209 These harmonization efforts reciprocally could facilitate implementation of the medical devices MRA by easing the FDA's review of European products and procedures. 210 context could involve less of a traditional vertical hierarchical order of command, than a horizontal one based on coordinated monitoring and supervision by transatlantic regulatory networks involving public and private actors. 212 Third, in an age of limited government resources for the oversight of rapidly changing, expanding and interacting economies, regulators also can save costs through enhanced cooperation with foreign regulatory officials and decentralizing product certification systems. The FDA simply does not have the resources to adequately conduct all testing itself, especially where testing involves significant foreign travel.
213 By permitting an "over-extended and underresourced" FDA 214 to outsource testing and evaluation of medical devices to private bodies, the FDA can reallocate its resources to areas of higher concern, while retaining high product and process standards and post-market surveillance controls. In particular, FDA officials are more concerned by medical devices produced in jurisdictions other than Europe, so that the transatlantic MRA could free up resources for it to address these other areas. Similarly, FDA officials admit that they are already unable to conduct annual pharmaceutical GMP reviews of foreign manufacturers as they would prefer, and thus the MRA could ensure more consistent oversight of foreign manufacturers' practices. 215 Fourth, from the perspective of democratic legitimacy, in an increasingly interdependent transatlantic economy in which choices in one jurisdiction can have significant impacts on constituents in others, regulatory decisions are more informed-and more inclusive-when made in the context of sustained regulatory exchange. A central normative goal of transgovernmental regulatory cooperative efforts is to create frameworks that conduce national regulators to reflexively take into account the impact of their actions on affected, but otherwise unrepresented, foreign constituents, while remaining deferential to disparate national values and priorities.
B. Limits to Transatlantic Regulatory Coordination. Irrespective of the potential benefits to firms and regulators, and irrespective of political pressure for regulatory adaptation, transatlantic regulatory cooperation remains by no means a foregone conclusion. While the New Transatlantic Agenda and Transatlantic Economic Partnership create various frameworks for regulatory coordination, significant obstacles remain, whether on account of institutional asymmetries, market contexts, differences in culture and values, or concerns over legitimacy. Principles. However, where regulatory agencies, such as the FDA and OSHA, experiment for the first time with delegating functions to private testing bodies, and, even more importantly, where these agencies are wary of new EC-like approaches, building and retaining the requisite trust and confidence requires considerable time and resources. Institutional learning curves are steep. Where the issues involve differences in complex regulatory systems, such as those covered by the 1997 medical device annex, independent agency interests more likely prevail because political pressure from the executive and legislative branches is difficult to sustain.
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As noted above, transatlantic mutual recognition agreements potentially could save costs for regulatory agencies. However, it remains unclear whether governments actually will save costs while ensuring consumer safety, at least in the short term. Cross-border regulatory interaction is not free, and thus the net benefits for regulators of the MRA remains an open question. Regulators on both sides of the Atlantic have had to dedicate considerable resources to implement the MRA, especially during the transition period. 217 Just to start, the effort entails considerable up-front negotiation costs and the costs of regulators learning and becoming comfortable with each other's systems. 218 The FDA estimated that it already had expended over $10 million dollars by June 2001 to implement the annex. 219 EC officials have been even further behind schedule, citing a lack of resources. By mid-2001, they had yet to conduct any joint tests or training of U.S. certification bodies' for the testing of medical devices. 220 Similarly, the FDA maintains that it does not have the resources to verify the equivalence of all fifteen member states' systems for implementation of the pharmaceutical GMP annex. . 217 Some regulators believe that these transition costs will be more than recouped, although others remain skeptical. In addition, the MRA's impact on public safety remains an open question, as its implementation remains at an early stage. However, there has been no evidence of a threat to public health on account of the EC's single market program, which arguably should also be the case with the transatlantic MRA. Nonetheless, considerable resources have been expended to implement the EC single market program. The United States has been unwilling to dedicate such resources to the MRA. 218 Negotiation of both the 2000 Safe Harbor Principles and 1997 Mutual Recognition Agreement required considerable personnel time and government expense. The 1997 MRA magnifies these costs, since both parties retain separate standards and procedures and thus must train each other's regulators and testing bodies in these standards and procedures. In the case of member state authorities and certification bodies from non-English speaking countries, especially from southern Europe, language issues create additional obstacles. For example, to implement the medical device annex, FDA has trained foreign private bodies in its methods, conducted joint inspections, and assessed detailed dossiers. A number of the European applicants submitted documents in a foreign language, which FDA returned for translation. Even after translation (at the Commission's expense), some applications were drafted in a broken English, again complicating FDA's task. Telephone interview with FDA official, June 7, 2001 . 219 See Steffenson, The EU-US Mutual Recognition Agreements, supra note.., at 22; See e.g. TACD Bruce Farquhar and Alex Donahue, Briefing Paper on Mutual Recognition Agreements 20 (September 2000) (on file with author) (citing U.S. General Accounting Office reports). 220 The EC training and approval process will involve a working group of member state regulatory officials and representatives of DG Enterprise. Interview with Commission official from DG Enterprise, June 15, 2001. 221 However, EC officials are unclear if the FDA is "merely playing games" with its assertions about resource constraints. EC officials point out that the EC has also signed an MRA on pharmaceutical GMPs with Canada, and Canada has completed evaluation of all fifteen member state regulatory systems within a shorter transition period. The EC has signed MRAs concerning pharmaceutical GMPs with Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Switzerland and Japan. Unlike the MRA with the United States, under these MRAs, the inspection reports are usually included by the manufacturer with its batch/lot certificate. Thus, the system will work in a more fluid manner, without direct exchanges of inspection reports between regulatory officials in most cases, although regulatory officials will retain the power to make such requests. Interview with Commission official, June 18, 2001, Brussels.
C. Moving Toward an EC Model? Overall, transatlantic institutional adaptation has been slow (and often creeping), but where it has occurred, it has been rather unidirectional, and will likely continue to be so. 222 Simply stated, the United States has made most of the changes. The United States has done so through adoption of international standards that mirror EC ones, through delegation of testing and certification responsibilities to private laboratories (reflecting the EC's "global approach"), and through coordination and oversight of these laboratories under a new U.S. national program analogous to those operating in the EC for over a decade. 223 Because the United States lacked a coordinated system of accredited testing and certification laboratories, European officials were concerned about the ability of U.S. regulators to guarantee the competence and quality of U.S. conformity assessment bodies. In response, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology, a division of the Department of Commerce, created a new U.S. program named the National Voluntary Conformity Assessment Program. Taking from the EC model, the U.S. program aims to coordinate and oversee U.S. conformity assessment bodies, and thereby provide greater confidence to regulatory officials, whether domestic or foreign. 224 Unlike their U.S. counterparts, EC regulatory authorities have operated for over a decade under a dual mission of ensuring public safety, on the one hand, and ensuring free movement of goods within the EC's single market, on the other. They consequently are more experienced in managing the coordination of distinct national regulatory systems than their U.S. counterparts. 225 The EC experience thus offers a model to be considered and adapted for the transatlantic context, although U.S. and EC regulators avoid formally acknowledging this on account of U.S. political sensitivities. Although Europe certainly has learned and borrowed from U.S. experiences with regulation, as in the fields of competition, consumer and environmental law, more recent transatlantic regulatory change has tended to adopt important aspects of an EC model. This tendency is opposite of that assessed by leading commentators on economic integration, such as Giandomenico Majone. 226 Yet, regardless of the EC model's appropriateness for transatlantic governance, the EC exercises significant market leverage in determining transatlantic standards and regulatory structures required to implement mutual recognition policies due to the size of its single market, which is already larger than that of the United States. This market leverage will only increase as the EC potentially expands its borders to encompass up to thirteen additional nations within the next decade. Firms that desire access to the large EC market can pressure their national officials to adapt their national system to accommodate a reciprocal trading arrangement. As the EC enters into mutual recognition agreements with other OECD countries, such as Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and Switzerland, and as these countries adapt their systems to interact with EC governance structures, the pressure on the United States to adapt its own regulatory structures could augment. The same process occurs as the EC negotiates with other countries regarding the adequacy of their data privacy protection laws, and as these countries adapt by enacting new legislation affecting the export of data to the United States. Consciously or unconsciously, the EC is exporting its systems globally. Assessing the legitimacy of enhanced bilateral regulatory cooperation raises questions of both substance (outputs) and procedure (inputs). From a substantive perspective, bilateral cooperation cannot be accomplished on the cheap or it could result in deregulatory measures with little oversight. This result would lead to challenges that the system benefits only producer, and not consumer interests, and thus that regulatory outcomes are substantively illegitimate. From a procedural perspective, citizens justifiably fear that they will have less control and access to international negotiations that result in regulatory decision-making made outside of their own borders, raising issues of procedural legitimacy.
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A number of consumer advocates, such as Public Citizen, distrust new transatlantic mutual recognition arrangements. 228 They are concerned about both procedures and substantive outcomes. The transatlantic push for regulatory coordination and reform arguably has led to increased delegation of traditional public services to private testing bodies. U.S. consumer advocates, in particular, distrust the adoption of the EC's decentralized approach based on other's decisions, in particular in areas affecting public health and safety where they are asked to rely on testing, certifications and accreditations by foreign laboratories and officials. They will only trust each other if they are assured that their regulatory counterparts have the necessary capacity to ensure the social goals of a coordinated regulatory program. As Majone writes regarding the EC's internal regulatory networks, "for a coordinated partnership… to operate effectively,… each participating organization must be able to perform the tasks assigned it, and there must be sufficient trust among the partners to keep the costs of transacting within acceptable limits."
236 Regulatory officials on both sides of the Atlantic complain that they simply do not have the resources to engage in the seminars, workshops, joint testing, inspections, and information exchange prescribed in the MRA, and necessary for its proper implementation. The Commission's DG Enterprise confirms that it has yet to locate the resources to properly implement the medical devices MRA. The FDA asserts that the MRA annexes under its responsibility constitute "unfunded mandates," because Congress has instructed the FDA to cooperate with trade officials in the negotiation and implementation of mutual recognition agreements, but has not provided it with the requisite resources. FDA officials are frustrated by what they view as "political pressure" from trade officials that "complicates our regulatory mission."
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This situation involves a curious reversal of arguments used by fiscal conservatives within the United States. Whereas it was the Congress of the "Gingrich Revolution" that decried "unfunded mandates" without cost-benefit analysis and the provision of adequate federal funding to state authorities to implement Congressional dictates, now consumer advocates and federal regulators decry unfunded mandates for cross-border regulatory coordination. Some consumer advocacy groups go even further, arguing that businesses, not taxpayers, should pay these costs. 238 Regardless of how the necessary regulatory resources are obtained, the MRA's proper implementation requires them. Without such resources, mutual recognition agreements could put consumer health and safety at greater risk. Given the United States' traditionally more inwardlooking approach, in particular, it is doubtful whether adequate resources will be dedicated to transatlantic regulatory collaboration. Thus, the prospects for effective new and global transatlantic economic governance mechanisms through the public sector are subject to significant constraints. As a result, the private sector likely will continue to take the lead in coordinating arrangements to meet disparate transatlantic regulatory requirements through private sector sub-contracting and other networking arrangements. 236 See Majone, Regulating Europe, supra note…, at 276. Majone further notes how "the principle of mutual recognition is extremely demanding in terms of mutual trust"). Id., at 279. 
